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THE GREEK-TURKISH FORUM: A PORTRAIT OF A TRACK 1.5 PEACE 
SUPPORT INITIATIVE 
Dr James Ker-Lindsay               
Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute, London School of Economics; Political Science 
and Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies, Department of Politics and 
International Relations, University of Oxford 
 
One of the most exciting developments for 
those working on trying to resolve conflict has 
been the emergence of what is called Track 
1.5 initiatives. Traditionally, efforts to resolve 
long-standing disputes between states would 
be managed by officials sitting across the 
table from each other in a very formal setting, 
either openly or in secret. Meanwhile, various 
non-governmental groups might try to 
contribute to peace by trying to pressure their 
governments or by attempting to build up 
wider public support for a conflict resolution 
process. 
The problem was that these two elements 
rarely had much contact with each other. 
Diplomats and politicians felt constrained 
from acting outside the bounds of their official 
roles, fearing that they would commit their 
countries to certain positions. Meanwhile, civil 
society organisations were rarely accorded a 
real say in the process. 
Track 1.5 efforts were deliberately designed 
to overcome the split between these two 
elements. The aim was to draw together 
people from society at large who were 
sufficiently well informed on an issue, and 
had the necessary standing to directly 
influence government, but who were not 
constrained by an official position. Such 
figures would therefore include politicians 
who did not hold a formal position in the 
administration: retired senior diplomats and 
military officers, business leaders, and other 
figures from the media and academia.  
In 1998 I was enormously privileged to 
become involved with one of the most 
successful of these efforts: the Greek-Turkish 
Forum. 
Looking back, it is easy to forget how bad 
relations were between Athens and Ankara at 
that point. In the two decades that followed 
the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 
1974, the two countries had come close to 
war on several occasions. The most recent 
flare-up of tensions had been in 1996, when 
the nations had come close to blows over a 
small, uninhabited islet in the eastern 
Aegean. 
It was against this backdrop that a small 
British charity, the Roberts Centre, which was 
then being run by a former British diplomat, 
Jamie Bruce-Lockhart, decided that perhaps 
something could be done to improve 
relations. He set out to identify a number of 
people from the two countries of sufficiently 
high public standing who might be amenable 
to face-to-face discussions with a range of 
counterparts. The end product was an 
impressive array of figures, including a former 
deputy foreign minister of Greece, a retired 
commander of the Turkish Navy, MPs, top 
professors and some of the most 
recognisable journalists in both countries. 
Having secured participants, the next task 
was to secure funding. We were enormously 
fortunate that both the Norwegian and British 
governments saw the value in this effort and 
both provided generous support. The next 
step was to provide a proper administrative 
basis for the group. I was hired to be the full 
time co-ordinator, based at the Royal United 
Services Institute in London. Meanwhile, the 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 
provided the necessary mediation expertise 
in the form of their then director, Dan Smith. 
All the while, Jamie Bruce-Lockhart worked 
behind the scenes with all the partners and 
participants to make sure it all ran smoothly. 
Right from the start, we were fortunate that all 
the members realised the responsibility on 
their shoulders. Everyone wanted to make it 
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work. More to the point, the two governments 
were willing to throw their support behind it. 
Both the Greek and Turkish teams had a 
direct line of communication with political 
leaders in their respective countries. 
Everyone knew this, which in turn gave the 
whole process an air of added seriousness. 
Ideas generated around the table had a very 
good chance of falling on the desks of the 
Greek and Turkish prime ministers. 
Nevertheless, the members quickly identified 
some ground rules. The first was that 
discussions would be confined to bilateral 
Greek-Turkish issues. The subject of Cyprus 
would not be brought up. Apart from the fact 
that it was just too contentious and emotional 
a topic, it was also understood that the 
Cyprus Problem was a matter for the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots, neither of which was 
represented in the room.  
Secondly, it was also decided that the 
meetings should not be secret. Secrecy 
would give rise to accusations that the group 
was some sort of cabal of worthies seeking to 
impose solutions over the heads of 
democratically elected leaders. This was 
never the case. Equally, however, the group 
also understood that if it was to have any 
hope of success, its discussions would have 
to be confidential. It was therefore decided 
that the group would put out press releases 
after its meetings, but that it would not 
actively seek to appear in the media to 
discuss its activities in any detail.  
Although the Forum got off to a very good 
start, within six months it faced a huge 
challenge. In February 1999, the leader of the 
PKK [Kurdistan  Workers’  Party]   – which had 
been waging a terrorist campaign in Turkey 
for the past decade and a half – was arrested 
leaving the Greek Embassy in Kenya. This 
caused a huge crisis between the two 
countries. Once again, there was even talk of 
war. Even now, I remember those days very 
well. Practically every other group working 
towards Greek-Turkish reconciliation 
collapsed. It became just too politically 
sensitive to be seen to be promoting peace. 
However, to their credit, the members of the 
Forum quickly decided to keep on going with 
their efforts. If anything, the crisis only served 
to underline the importance of what they were 
doing.  
Obviously, things had to be managed 
particularly carefully over the next few 
months.   But,   in   the   end,   the   Forum’s  
willingness to keep going paid off. By the end 
of summer that year, relations between 
Greece and Turkey entered a whole new 
positive phase following a series of natural 
disasters that led to an unprecedented 
outpouring of public goodwill. In this new 
environment, the Greek-Turkish Forum 
thrived. The fact that the members had held 
together through a period of heightened 
tension served to strengthen their sense of 
camaraderie and joint purpose. More to the 
point, it now started to produce more and 
more confidence building measures (CBMs) 
between the two countries, ranging from 
technical proposals to limit the danger of 
accidental engagements between military 
forces, through to efforts to promote contacts 
across a range of political, economic, social, 
cultural and educational fields. 
So, where does the Greek-Turkish Forum 
stand today? I am pleased to say that it is still 
going, although my personal involvement 
ended many years ago. It is perhaps a sign of 
its standing and the trust built up amongst its 
members that it now discusses Cyprus, 
having brought on board participants from the 
island. Likewise, it no longer stands in the 
shadows. Its contribution to peace is now 
publicly recognised. In large part this is also a 
reflection of the almost unbelievable 
improvement in relations between Athens and 
Ankara. While the bilateral territorial problems 
still exist between the two countries, the level 
of interaction between the governments and 
the people is nothing short of extraordinary. I 
am proud to say that the Greek-Turkish 
Forum can take some credit for this state of 
affairs. 
 
 
